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1 Introduction
The labor market assimilation and the economic integration of new immigrants are
crucial to their overall success and to that of the host country. What is the role
of other immigrants from the same country of origin in determining such economic
success? Do new immigrants benefit from their presence when looking for jobs and
careers? Or are new immigrants constrained by them, as these networks limit them
to informal channels missing the larger labor market and, possibly, discouraging them
from the acquisition of general human capital? How do the effects differ between the
short run and the long run? This paper answers these questions using survey data
on recent immigrants to Germany from the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample matched
with the universe of administrative records of the German social security archive
(Integrierte ErwerbsBiografie or IEB). The merged dataset, which is very novel,
includes pre-migration information on individual migrants and follows them after
arrival in Germany collecting yearly information on labor market, demographic and
education variables. Our findings inform whether policies encouraging immigrants
concentration or those encouraging dispersion are more conducive to short and long-
run success in the labor market.
The causal effect of the size of the co-ethnic network on immigrants’ labor market
success is not easy to assess. The main challenge is that the size of the co-ethnic
network (i.e. the network of individuals from the same country of origin) itself affects
the type of immigrants drawn to the area and it is therefore likely to be correlated
with observable and unobservable characteristics. Comparing post-migration out-
comes of new immigrants between areas with large and small co-ethnic networks
would imply comparing individuals that are systematically different. New immi-
grants tend to cluster where co-ethnic immigrants are already settled both in the
US (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997, and Borjas, 1998), and in Germany (Glitz, 2014) and
this tendency may vary across ethnicity and with immigrants characteristics. For
instance, using social security data for Germany in 2008, Glitz (2014) computes mea-
sures of segregation and finds that Western Europeans1 and Turks were the groups
with the highest segregation indices. He also finds that less educated immigrants
were more segregated than more educated ones. Since these and other unobserved
characteristics are correlated with the economic success of immigrants, OLS analysis
will not identify correctly the causal effect of the local co-ethnic network.
1Excluding Italy and Greece.
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In order to think more systematically about the role of co-ethnic networks in
affecting the short and long-run employment and wage outcomes of new immigrants,
we discuss a simple theoretical framework. A partial equilibrium search model illus-
trates the trade-off between employment and human capital investment after arrival
in the destination country. We consider workers receiving employment offers through
a formal search channel and an informal/network-based channel. How effective the
latter is depends on the size of the local co-ethnic network. On the other hand, the
effectiveness of the formal search method is affected by one’s stock of human capital.
Job opportunities have a distribution of wages that can be different between formal
and informal offers and they are accepted if they pay more than the reservation
wage. The key predictions of our model are that, while large co-ethnic networks
have a positive effect on the chances of finding employment after arrival, over time
immigrants who started in locations with small co-ethnic networks catch up and may
have similar or higher employment probabilities and higher wages. The closing of the
employment gap is due to the higher human capital investment of new immigrants
in markets with small initial co-ethnic networks. For them, the incentive to increase
their general human capital is higher and the cost is lower in the short run, because
the opportunity cost of the foregone job search is smaller. Therefore, our model
suggests that it is important to distinguish between short-run and long-run impacts
of co-ethnic networks on employment, wages and human capital. This distinction
has not received much attention in the literature, partly because of the lack of direct
measures of human capital investment by immigrants, and partly because of a very
limited availability of panel datasets following immigrants. As long as human capital
investments are important for the economic assimilation of immigrants, the long-run
focus of this analysis is key to set up effective policies.
We then investigate whether these simple predictions hold empirically. We are
contributing to the literature in three ways. First, we estimate the dynamic (short
and long-run) effects of the size of the co-ethnic network at arrival on new immi-
grants’ employment by taking advantage of the panel nature of our dataset.2 Second,
we analyze the investment in human capital of new immigrants after arrival as an ad-
ditional outcome. This is a crucial margin to understand the differences in outcomes
between the short and long run. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other
study that investigates the role of co-ethnic networks on human capital investment
2To our knowledge Edin et al. (2003) is the only study shortly mentioning the dynamics of the
network effect, though the paper focuses entirely on the static mechanism.
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of first-generation immigrants after their arrival in the destination country.3 Third,
thanks to the novel survey data, we have direct information on job search methods
and in particular on whether people have found jobs through personal contacts or
through market/agency/Internet search. Hence, this study is one of the rare cases
in which we can directly check the importance of a “network” channel in finding a
job and test if the predictions align with those of the model.4
As mentioned above, the identification of a causal effect of network size on new
immigrants’ outcomes is difficult: the endogenous sorting of new immigrants across
locations along observable and unobservable characteristics poses a big challenge. Lo-
cation decisions depend on individual characteristics that may affect post-migration
labor market outcomes. A first approach used in the literature for reducing the selec-
tion bias is measuring co-ethnic networks at a relatively broad local level. As pointed
out by Bertrand et al. (2000), Cutler and Glaeser (1997) and Dustmann and Preston
(2001), immigrants’ location decisions are affected by the presence of previous immi-
grants in the specific district of residence (typically a city block), but much less by
their presence in the larger region (local labor market). Still that local presence of
co-ethnic networks helps job connections and is used as explanatory variable. This
strategy is helpful, but does not fully address the problems of endogenous sorting.
Recent papers, including Edin et al. (2003) and Damm (2009), have exploited a dif-
ferent strategy. Researchers have noticed that national and international dispersal
policies, usually applied to refugees, have generated an exogenous initial location of
refugees. These policies, by distributing individuals independently of their skills and
labor characteristics, have generated quasi-experimental variation in the initial ex-
posure to co-ethnic networks, which could be used to identify a causal effect on later
outcomes. Limiting the attention to refugees makes this type of identification credi-
ble. However, this group is very different from the rest of the immigrant population,
limiting the external validity of such an exercise.5 Refugees come from traumatic
situations, often experience periods of non-employment before migration, and come
from specific countries. This might not correspond to the experience of other im-
migrants, usually attracted by family and employment opportunities. Hence the
3Investments in schooling and education are mentioned in other studies (for example in Edin
et al. (2003) and Damm (2009)) as possible channels through which networks have an effect. They
have never been studied directly, however, because of data limitations.
4A rare study analyzing the channels through which people find jobs and relating them to
network size is Dustmann et al. (2016), where the network is defined at the firm level.
5Table D.1 in Appendix D shows that in our dataset these differences are substantial.
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network effects on refugees may not be representative of those on other immigrants.
Our approach improves on these methods for two reasons. First, the survey
data provide us with pre-migration characteristics of immigrants such as employ-
ment status, work experience, education level, language proficiency, and cognitive
abilities before arrival. This allows us to control for several relevant characteristics
(considered as unobservable in previous studies) and to test how these pre-migration
characteristics are correlated to their initial location and in particular to the size of
the local co-ethnic network at arrival. Second, as our data include different national
groups in different cities over time we can control for nation-level fixed effects that
should absorb all the common traits from a group and for city-year fixed effects
that absorb local economic conditions. Third, we can identify in our sample those
individuals who were subject to dispersal policies (refugees and ethnic Germans in
this case). By doing so we can evaluate how the estimated effects for all immigrants
compare with those on the randomly dispersed group of refugees and ethnic Ger-
mans, after including fixed effects and pre-migration characteristics. This allows us
to assess the external validity of effects estimated on a restricted group and how
effectively we corrected for omitted variable and selection bias, using fixed effects
and controls, in the sample of all immigrants. Similar estimates using either method
would significantly reduce worries of selection and omitted variable bias.
Our three main empirical findings support the key predictions of the model.
First, we find that immigrants in districts with larger initial co-ethnic networks
are significantly more likely to find employment within their first three years in
Germany. Second, we find that this advantage fades away in the longer run and it
is not present after around five years. Third, the likelihood that immigrants carry
out human capital investments within three years since migration decreases with the
size of co-ethnic network at arrival. As general human capital investment improves
the opportunities in the labor market (in terms of wage and employment), the initial
advantage in employment probability due to large-networks fades away over time.
Even when controlling for district-year, origin-year, and origin-district fixed ef-
fects to absorb local economic effects, and controlling for individual pre-migration
characteristics, we find significant positive short-run effects of the size of co-ethnic
network on employment probability and negative short-run effects on human capital
investment. In addition, we find that, in the long-run, the advantage in employment
probability disappears and immigrants with smaller initial co-ethnic network have
higher wages, possibly because of larger investments in human capital and better
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match quality. Immigrants with smaller initial co-ethnic networks are also less likely
to find their job through referrals. These effects are largely driven by less educated
immigrants, while for those with tertiary education the size of initial network does
not seem to affect economic outcomes. Finally, when we restrict our analysis to the
sample of refugees and ethnic Germans subject to dispersal policies,6 we find similar
effects of initial network on initial employment probability and on human capital
investments, which suggests that our panel estimates do not suffer from omitted
variable and selection bias. We also perform a series of robustness checks and fal-
sification exercises, including a different definition of the geographic level at which
we measure networks, a placebo-type exercise where we address possible concerns of
the networks being a proxy for local demand fluctuations. These exercises confirm
our main results and the validity of our identification strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related
literature in relation to our contribution. In Section 3 we present our theoretical
setup. Section 4 describes our data sources and presents some summary statistics;
Section 6 discusses identification, estimating specification and results, including ro-
bustness checks and test for the determinants of initial location. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to research on the effects of networks on job search and labor
market outcomes. Much of this literature does not analyze immigrants per se, but
focuses on the role of social networks on economic outcomes in general. Important
theoretical contributions to the modeling of social networks and their effects on the
labor market build on Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004). Beaman (2012) develops
a network model with multiple cohorts to investigate the relative importance of
information transmission and competition in networks and their consequences on the
labor market. Bayer et al. (2008) investigate the effect of living in the same city block
on the likelihood of working together, finding an important role for referrals in the
labor market. Goel and Lang (2009) show that networks may bring about additional
job offers, thereby raising the observed wages of workers in jobs found through formal
channels relative to those in jobs found through the network.7 Our model, which
6See section B in the Appendix for the institutional background. Glitz (2012) also uses this
group exploiting its random allocation as a source of exogenous variation in labor supply.
7Pellizzari (2010) also develops a search model with a formal and an informal channel and match
specific productivity.
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builds upon Goel and Lang (2009), combines a simple search model with the choice
of human capital investment. Several papers frame networks as alternative to search
in the general labor market. The network provides an advantage in the probability
of a match but it may be limited by the specificity and cost of referrals. Galenianos
(2013, 2014) develop models where network and formal market coexist and different
individuals use either of them depending on relative costs and benefits. Our model
can be seen as a simple case within this line of inquiry.
As mentioned above, a number of papers use the initial dispersal of refugees
across locations to achieve empirical identification of the effect of the co-ethnic net-
works on labor market outcomes. Edin et al. (2003) use data from a dispersal policy
in Sweden and find positive effects of network size on earnings for less skilled immi-
grants. They also point out that networks might have a positive effect on information
and a negative effect on human capital acquisition. However, they are not able to in-
vestigate the empirical importance of that channel because their data do not include
any measure of human capital investment. Similarly, Damm (2009) investigates the
effects of ethnic enclaves on labor market outcomes in Denmark by taking advantage
of a dispersal policy and finds a large positive static effect of ethnic enclaves on earn-
ings after migration. Xie and Gough (2011) analyze the role of ethnic enclaves on
labor market outcomes in the US, and find no evidence of a positive effect of ethnic
enclaves on earnings of new immigrants. However, the analysis is mainly based on
correlations. Hellerstein et al. (2011) look at the role of residential proximity on the
chances that workers work at the same establishment.8
Recently, interesting work looks at the role of referrals on employment outcomes
at the firm level. Dustmann et al. (2016) develop a model of job referrals by which
current employees in a firm provide information on potential candidates, and test
the main predictions of the model using information on ethnic origin of employees of
a large metropolitan market in Germany. They find that firms tend to hire workers
from ethnic groups that are already represented in the firm and that hiring through
referrals pay higher wages and exhibits lower turnover. This suggests that referrals
may improve the quality of employer-employee matches. Similarly, Patacchini and
8Using Danish administrative data, Bennett et al. (2015) look at the role of attitudes as well as
networks on educational attainments of teenagers with a migration background. Åslund et al. (2011)
analyze the role of neighborhood characteristics on the school performance of immigrant children,
using data from an exogenous refugee policy in Sweden. Using the mass migration wave to Israel as
exogenous variation, Gould et al. (2009) look at the effects of high exposure to immigrants during
elementary school on the long-term educational attainment of natives.
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Zenou (2012) analyze the effect of ethnic networks on job search methods, and find
results that confirm a positive role of networks on the probability of finding a job
through referral. Analysis from our survey confirms these findings.
We believe that our paper has several original features, relative to the previous
literature. First, our combination of data on the pre- and post-migration history of
individual workers is novel. Then the measures of co-ethnic network in the place
of arrival, based on the universe of immigrant workers, is also more precise and
detailed than that of other studies, enabling panel analysis with a richer set of fixed
effects. Finally, the possibility of comparing all immigrants to a group of immigrants
whose initial location was determined by dispersal is also unique. Controlling for pre-
migration features of immigrants and local economic conditions is important for the
identification of the effects of interest, and using all immigrants (rather than refugees
only) is important for external validity. We also perform an analysis of the dynamic
effects of networks from arrival throughout the working career of immigrants, and
include for the first time the analysis of investment in human capital.
3 Theoretical Framework
The main goal of our very simple framework, which builds upon Montgomery (1991)
and Goel and Lang (2009), is to illustrate the trade-off between search and human
capital investments, which provides the key insight for our empirical predictions.
Let us consider two periods, t = 1, 2. At the beginning of t = 1 the agent (a newly-
arrived immigrant) enters the local economy with a certain level of human capital,
which we take as exogenous. The level of human capital in periods 1 and 2 are
denoted by h1 and h2. We interpret human capital as the general set of skills that
are valued in the host country labor market. The initial value of h is determined by
its pre-migration level and its transferability. The size of co-ethnic network at the
initial location is denoted as n1. We denote a certain realization of h by h¯ and a
certain realization of n by n¯. The first period is the arrival period in the destination
country, and we assume that all individuals are initially unemployed.
There are two mechanisms through which workers receive job offers.9 First,
when searching for a job, there is a certain probability that the worker receives
9A more general model is van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006), where the intensity of the
search is endogenous. For simplicity in our model the only endogenous choice is whether to search
or to invest in human capital during the first period.
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an offer through the formal channel.10 We denote this probability by pf and we
assume that it depends positively on the human capital level of the individual, so
that ∂pf (h)/∂h > 0, and that it does not depend on the size of the local network.
The individual may also receive an offer from the co-ethnic network channel (or in-
formal channel) with a probability pi, which depends positively on the size of the
co-ethnic network, such that ∂pi(n¯)/∂n > 0 and does not depend on the individ-
ual’s human capital. We assume decreasing marginal returns for both channels, i.e.
∂2pi(n)/∂n
2 < 0 and ∂2pf (h)/∂h¯
2 < 0.11
At the beginning of each period, the worker decides whether to search for a job
or to invest in general human capital, engaging in activities that increase her human
capital level h. If the individual looks for a job, she has some chances of getting an
offer from either channel, as outlined above. We do not need to assume that wages
are drawn from the same wage offer distribution in the formal and network channel.
We restrict, however, wages drawn from either distribution to be always positive,
we assume the draws to be independent and that the two wage offer distributions
have overlapping support.12 For convenience, we assume that those distributions
do not change between period 1 and period 2. We denote the common cumulative
distribution of wage offers obtained in the formal channel as Ff (w). Correspondingly,
wage offers in the network channel are drawn from Fi(w). Instead of searching for a
job, the individual can increase her human capital endowment. Her human capital
after education is h¯′ > h¯. We assume that h¯′ = h¯+A where A is a positive quantity.
This is equivalent to assuming that human capital increase is independent from its
initial level. Combined with ∂2pf (h)/∂h¯
2 < 0, this assumption implies that investing
in education has larger marginal effects on labor market perspectives of individuals
with low initial levels of human capital. At the beginning of period 2, an agent that
has chosen human capital investment in the previous period is more likely to get
offers through the formal channel, and therefore less likely to be unemployed, and
has a higher expected wage (because of the possibility of receiving two offers).
The key decision for the agent is made at the beginning of period 1. If she searches
10One characterization of the “formal channel” would be a matching mechanism where applicants
send applications with their resumes to employers or to an employment agency.
11Since pi and pf are probabilities, they are bounded between zero and one. However, we are not
imposing the constraint that pf + pi = 1. This is because in our model an individual searching for
a job can get either zero, one or two offers.
12This means that the highest possible offer from one of the two distributions cannot be lower
than the lowest offer from the other distribution. In that case, there would be no gain in drawing
two offers instead of one. That is a case we can deal with, but believe that it is not of interest.
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for a job, she will receive an offer through the formal channel with probability pf (h¯),
and an offer through the network channel with probability pi(n¯). If she receives
no offer, she remains unemployed, receives unemployment payments bu and begins
period 2 with the same level of human capital h2 = h1 = h¯. If she receives one offer,
from either channel, she will accept it if higher than bu and reject it otherwise. We
assume bu to be time invariant and that the agent gets no utility from leisure, so the
decision in the second period is equivalent to the one in the first period. If the agent
receives two offers, she will accept the higher offer if it is higher than bu, and reject
both otherwise. If the individual decides to get education instead, she receives bh in
period 1 with certainty, and will have a higher level of human capital h2 = h¯
′ > h¯,
in period 2. This allows her to have more chances to receive an offer from the formal
channel at t = 2. We assume that bu ≥ bh to allow for some costs of education.
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3.1 Preferences
Our agent values consumption and discounts second period outcomes at the rate
0 < β < 1. We assume utility to be linear in consumption14
EU(c1, c2) = c1 + βE(c2) (1)
As a standard two-period model, the solution is best described using backward in-
duction. We start by illustrating possible payoffs at period 2. At t = 2, human
capital investment will not occur since bu ≥ bh. Therefore, the individual will search
for a job at t = 2 for all realizations of the exogenous parameters. If the agent
acquired human capital in period t = 1, she will be able to search for a job with
a higher probability of receiving an offer through the formal channel, and therefore
also a higher probability of receiving two offers. If the agents searched in period 1,
she will search again with the same human capital endowment as in t = 1.15
13While this assumption seems natural in this context, it is stronger than needed in our model,
as we only need to assume that expected income is larger for those who look for a job at t = 2.
None of the main propositions discussed below depend on this assumption.
14Implicitly we are assuming that individuals are endowed with one unit of “effort” (or time) each
period and supply it to education or search/work.
15We assume separation rates at the end of each period to be equal to one so that our problem is
recursive. None of our qualitative results depends on this assumption. We are not investigating the
possibility that employment can generate human capital as well. As long as the growth in human
capital is smaller when working than when in school, the main results of our model are robust to
relaxing this assumption.
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3.2 Value functions
At the beginning of t = 2, all individuals search for a job. If the agent has searched
at t = 1 (whether or not she found a job in that period) then h2 = h1 = h¯, and her
expected payoff from searching in period 2 is
S2(n¯, h¯) = bu + pi(1− pf )
∫
max{W2(xi)− bu, 0}dFi(xi)
+ pf (1− pi)
∫
max{W2(xf )− bu, 0}dFf (xf )
+ pipf
∫
max{W2(xi)− bu,W2(xf )− bu, 0}dFi(xi)dFf (xf ) ≡ S(n¯, h¯)
(2)
where we omitted the dependence of pi and pf on network size n¯ and human capital h¯.
Searching in period 2 means the agent gets at least bu, and has a certain probability
to receive wage offers that are higher than bu. The agent may instead enter period
2 after having invested in human capital in period t = 1. In this case her human
capital is h¯′ > h¯ and therefore the value of searching is S(n¯, h¯′) > S(n¯, h¯) because
of our assumption that ∂pf/∂h > 0 (under this assumption ∂S2/∂pf > 0).
At the beginning of period 1 the agent decides whether to make an educational
investment or to search for a job immediately, and will do so taking account of how
that choice affects outcomes at t = 2. If the agent decides to search for a job in
period t = 1 given an initial network size of n¯ and initial human capital level h¯ the
value function can be simply written as:
S1(n¯, h¯) = S(n¯, h¯) + βS(n¯, h¯) = (1 + β)S(n¯, h¯) (3)
A searching individual gets the value of being unemployed plus the possible gain
from employment. At the beginning of period 1 the individual may instead decide
to invest in human capital. The corresponding value function is
H1(n¯, h¯) = bh + βS(n¯, h
′) (4)
Costs of education are incorporated in bh.
16 Education increases future employment
possibilities as the newly acquired skills are useful to find a job in the host economy.
Therefore, the lower employment prospects are and the higher the discount rate (β)
is, the more likely it is that an agent invests in human capital at t = 1.
16Results may be different for a risk-averse agent since returns to education are stochastic.
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3.3 Employment and Human Capital Investment
The simple structure described above is sufficient to illustrate the main trade-off
faced by the agent. Human capital investment increases employment and expected
wages in the future, at the cost of foregoing current earnings. After observing her
level of human capital and the size of the social network at the beginning of period
1, the individual decides whether to look for a job or to acquire human capital. The
optimal decision between searching and acquiring human capital will be given by
comparing S1(n¯, h¯) and H1(n¯, h¯). Next, we discuss how this optimal choice depends
on the initial level of n¯ and h¯. We are able to make three simple predictions in a
comparative statics exercise.
Proposition 1 For each level of n1 there is at most one “reservation” level of h1
below which the agent will invest in human capital and above which the agent will
search for a job in period 1. See Appendix A for discussion.
For a given level of n1, both the value of searching and the value of investing
in human capital are increasing, concave functions of h1. Under our assumptions,
the relative first and second derivatives are such that the two curves S1(n¯, h) and
H1(n¯, h) will intersect at most once in the h space.
17 Depending on functional form
and support of h and n, corner solutions may exist: initial social networks n may
be so large that the agent may find it optimal to search for a job irrespective of the
level of h. Following Proposition 1, for a given level of social networks, individuals
with higher human capital are more likely to be employed in period 1 and less likely
to invest in further human capital. Individuals with lower human capital are more
likely to get education and less likely to be employed soon after arrival.
Proposition 2 For each level of h1 there is at most one “reservation” level of n1
below which the agent will invest in human capital and above which the agent will
search for a job in period 1. See Appendix A for discussion.
For a fixed value of h1 = h, S1(n, h) is increasing in the level of n1, because
n1 positively affect offers’ arrival rate via the network channel. It is only slightly
more subtle to see why the value of human capital investment is lower at higher
values of n1. Let us imagine a case in which an individual with a very large social
network decided to acquire further education in period 1. Despite the higher level of
17We analyze the two functions S1 and H1 in more detail below and in Appendix A.
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human capital, it would still be relatively likely for her to get an offer in the informal
sector compared to the formal sector, and therefore for her further human capital
investment makes less of a difference. Corner solutions may exist in this case as well:
there might be levels of human capital that are high enough such that the agent
searches for a job in period 1 for any possible level of social networks. Proposition 2
implies that individuals with larger co-ethnic networks are less likely to get further
education and more likely to be employed in the first period.
Proposition 3 The magnitudes of the effects of networks on employment and hu-
man capital investment are lower if the individual has a higher initial human capital
endowment. See Appendix A for discussion.
Individuals with higher initial human capital endowment h1 are relatively more
likely to find a job through the formal channel compared to individuals with the same
networks but with lower initial human capital endowment. The marginal effect of
network size in the value functions of individuals with initially high human capital is
therefore going to be smaller. While qualitative effects of network size are unaffected,
effects on employment are quantitatively larger for individuals with lower initial
human capital endowments.18
Summarizing, based on our model we expect individuals with larger initial co-
ethnic networks to be more likely to find employment after arrival. However, our
model also predicts the positive effect of a co-ethnic network on employment prob-
ability to decrease over time, because individuals with smaller co-ethnic networks
“catch up” through human capital investment. Finally, the effect of network size
on employment probability and on human capital investment after immigration are
larger for individuals with lower initial human capital. Figure 1 summarizes the
main features of the equilibrium of our model. It plots the value functions of an
individual, S1 and H1, as a function of initial network size. An individual with lower
initial human capital h will optimally decide to invest in human capital if her initial
network size is below nh, and she will search for a job if it is larger. This illustrates
18In order to make predictions concerning whether we expect individuals with low initial human
capital or individuals with high initial human capital to be more likely to invest in it, we need to
give some structure to the returns to human capital. If returns to human capital are smaller for
individuals with high initial human capital endowment, which is the standard assumption in the
literature and has support in our data, individuals with lower initial human capital are more likely
to invest in its improvements. Results would change if returns to human capital were larger for
individuals with larger initial stocks. This case would be closer to Regets and Duleep (1999).
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Proposition 2 above. The two thicker curves in Figure 1 are instead drawn for an in-
dividual with higher human capital nh > nh. Both S1 and H1 are higher (because at
higher human capital levels the expected utilities are higher due to higher probabil-
ity of job offers) and flatter (reflecting the fact that marginal effects of network size
are smaller at higher levels of human capital, because offers are more likely to come
from the formal channel, making networks less relevant for labor market outcomes
as in Proposition 3). The new threshold for network size below which the individual
invests in human capital is now lower at nh, because the shift of the value function
for search is larger than that of the value function for human capital investment.19
This shift from h to h is an illustration of Proposition 1 above. The figure shows a
range of intermediate network sizes for which individuals with lower levels of initial
human capital invest, while individuals with higher levels of initial human capital
search for a job in the first period.
3.4 Wages
In the paragraphs above, we have discussed the implications of our model for employ-
ment and human capital investment. Next, we look at the effects on observed wages,
i.e. wages of those who are employed. Even if the distributions of wages from each
channel (market and network) are given, the realized wage of an individual depends
on the probability of getting competing offers. When an individual has a higher
chance of receiving two offers, she also has a larger expected wage, but may not have
a higher observed wage. Therefore, without additional assumptions on the wage dis-
tributions of the two channels, our model cannot deliver any predictions on relative
observed wages at t = 1, because more chances to draw from a distribution can lower
observed wages of the employed. For the analysis below, we therefore further assume
that the wage offer distribution of the formal channel and of the network channel
have the same expected value. This rules out that a higher probability of receiving
an additional offer depresses average wages. Under this assumption, observed wages
at t = 1 are a monotonically increasing function of n: conditional on h1, a higher
n¯ increases the likelihood of receiving two offers, which is associated with a higher
expected wage (although this effect may be weak).
The relationship between initial network size and observed wages at t = 2 is
slightly more complicated. Assuming that initial human capital is low enough that
19We discuss the details of this in our Appendix.
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an internal solution exists, at low levels of n1, the individual will acquire human
capital and enter period 2 with h2 > h1. Observed wages at time t = 2 are increasing
in n1 because larger social networks increase the probability of receiving two offers.
However, this effect exhibits a discontinuity at the level of social networks above
which the individual does not invest in human capital at t = 1. If n1 is high enough
the individual will not find it profitable to invest in human capital at t = 1, then
her wages at t = 2 will be lower. For changes in initial network size that are large
to matter for human capital accumulation decisions, individuals with larger network
are expected to have lower wages in the long run. Figure 2 depicts the relationship
between the wage in the second period and the size of the network, graphically.20 As
for the previous result, we expect this effect to be concentrated among those with
relatively low initial human capital, for whom initial network size is more likely to
matter for human capital decisions.
3.5 Networks and Welfare
Describing the welfare implications of different distributions of networks in the so-
ciety is beyond the scope of our work. However, a brief discussion on the way
networks may matter for both individual and social welfare may be useful. In our
simple model, networks may induce people to invest less in human capital. However,
that choice is optimal at the individual level and – with rational, forward looking
agents and no externalities – also maximizes utilitarian social welfare. On the other
hand, there are realistic scenarios under which this may not be the case and where
larger networks may hurt social welfare, while increasing individual welfare. First,
if we introduced progressive taxation, returns to education at the individual level
would be lower than at the level of the society as a whole. Alternatively, if individual
migrants discount the future more than the social planner, or if education generates
positive externalities, agents may be underinvesting in general human capital (from
the perspective of the social planner) and this underinvestment would be more severe
when there are large networks and for less educated people. In these cases, there
would be an economic rationale for a government intervention to encourage immi-
grants to distribute across locations, or that encourages searching via the formal
channel (where there may be limited opportunities for immigrants) rather than via
networks.
20Figure 2 is drawn under the assumption that initial human capital is low enough to make
human capital investment at t = 1 optimal for low enough n.
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4 Data
Our primary dataset is the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample, a large survey of immi-
grants to Germany conducted in two waves that took place in 2013 and 2014. The
survey oversamples immigrants who arrived in Germany after 1994. We use the
subsample of the survey that has been linked to the social security data (which
includes all workers covered by the social security system, excluding civil servants,
self-employed, and military personnel) selecting only foreign-born people aged 15-
65.21 We are able to observe several individual pre-migration characteristics, as well
as the entire labor market history after migration to Germany. The data on employ-
ment and wages are from IEB and cover the period 1975-2013.22 Wages are measured
as average real hourly wage of all full-time working spells in the year excluding ap-
prenticeship, or marginal employment. Our measure of human capital investment
originates from the survey data. The survey provides a full account of each year
spent in education as each individual is asked retrospectively to fill a life-long calen-
dar and to report for each year, starting from age 15, whether in that year she was
in education.23 We use this information to reconstruct an individual life-long panel
of spells of education and we merge this to the individual administrative records.24
The variable capturing the co-ethnic network size at arrival for each immigrant is
calculated as the number of workers by nationality25 as share of total employment in
each district in the year in which the immigrant first arrives to Germany.26 This share
is calculated using the full registry of employees in Germany (IEB). The number of
German districts is 404, with an average size of 65,801 workers per district and a
median size of 42,643. Our sample of immigrants is distributed across 229 districts.
21The survey is targeted at individuals with any migration background, including second gener-
ation immigrants. See Appendix C for details.
22A person is considered employed if she ever works within the year. We check the robustness
of the results to this criterion by using alternative definitions of employment, see Table D.5. The
results are robust to defining an individual as employed if she/he works at least 25, 50, or 75 percent
of the year, or at a cut-off date.
23Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish the type of education, but, given our selected age range,
we argue that school episodes play a minor role. In addition, we exclude individuals that are in
school at the time of the survey and individuals that entered Germany as students.
24To limit recall bias, we also use administrative data, setting the variable to zero if the person
in the corresponding year works for at least 50 percent of the time.
25Due to sample size considerations, we group them into eight country groups: Western countries
including Western Europe, Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe, Turkey, USRR, Asia and Middle
East, Africa, Central and South America.
26We define the living district as the one corresponding to the longest spell within the year, and
impute this information from the workplace district in case of missing values.
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Our network measure has an average size of 0.011 with a standard deviation of 0.015
and an highest value of 0.11. The immigrants with the highest value of the average
co-ethnic network size are those from Western Europe (0.033) followed by Turkish
immigrants (0.027), and South-Eastern European immigrants (0.019).
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical analy-
sis. The top panel of this table reports averages for time-varying individual variables.
The first of them, however, Netwcd0 measures the size of the co-ethnic network at
time of arrival (described above) and is fixed for an individual. The employment
probability has an average of 68.8 percent in the individual-year observations.27 The
average wage per hour earned in the sample is around 8.5 Euros for full-time work-
ers. Individuals in the sample are investing in education, i.e. spending some time in
school or training, in 4.4 percent of the individual-year observations. Education and
training are more likely when an immigrant first arrives and the share of individual-
year in education is higher during the early years of their stay in Germany: twelve
percent among immigrants in Germany for two years or less was in school part of
the year, but that percentage was less than 2 for immigrants in Germany for at least
six years (see Table D.2). Symmetrically, employment rates increase with time since
arrival. During the first two years only 48 percent of individuals work, while after 10
years more than 76 percent are employed (see Table D.2). Our panel is unbalanced,
the average number of years since migration observed is 7.56, whereas the median
value is 6 years. Around 23 percent of observations are relative to individuals who
lived between zero and two years in Germany, 21 percent for three to five years, and
56 percent have been in Germany six or more years. Our sample is comprised of
relatively young individuals – the average age is 37 years old.
The bottom panel of Table 1 lists averages of time-invariant individual character-
istics mainly relative to ethnicity, country of origin and pre-migration characteristics.
These information are obtained from the IAB-SOEP immigrant survey. Our sample
consists of 933 foreign born individuals28 in working age (15-65 years old), who are
27We define employment as working for any extent of time during the year. This share falls to
56.3 percent if we count as employed only those working for at least 50 percent of days.
28Using country of birth to identify immigrants is a much more precise definition, and this
represents an improvement with respect to all previous papers using German administrative data,
which can only identify immigrants via nationality. This is particularly important for Germany,
where the large group of ethnic Germans is entitled to receive the German nationality by law. To
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linked to the registry data. Among those immigrants, we select individuals whose
date of arrival reported in the survey is within three years of their first appear-
ance in the registry data. As we do not have information on the district of arrival
from the survey, we take the district of first registration in the administrative data
as capturing the place of arrival of the new immigrant.29 In addition to the stan-
dard characteristics, such as gender, age, and region of origin, we include a set of
pre-migration characteristics that we use throughout the analysis: education, work
experience, language proficiency, and employment status one year before migration.
The survey data also report the job search method for the first job found in Germany,
as well as a measure of self-assessed over-qualification in the current job. Our sample
reflects the fact that people are relatively young when they migrate: age at migration
is 30.5 years on average with a median age of 29. We find that 54.3 percent of the
immigrant sample found their first job in Germany through personal contacts,30 63.5
percent among low-skilled immigrants (those with at most lower secondary school).
The information on job search method is rarely available in data that collect labor
market outcomes. It allows us to test the importance of local co-ethnic networks in
finding a job via personal referrals. Finally, 41.3 percent of those currently working
report to have a degree higher than the level of schooling required for that job, which
may suggest a certain degree of “downgrading” whereby individuals are matched to
jobs that do not require the skills they have.31
the best of our knowledge, Dustmann et al. (2016) is the only other study using this definition of
immigrant with German administrative data.
29Our results are robust to restricting the analysis to individuals whose year of arrival corresponds
exactly to the first year in the registry data (55 percent). There are also cases in which the individual
appears in the administrative data before the last migration year reported in the survey. In those
cases we consider as year of arrival the first appearance in the registry data if the person appears
working at least once in the subsequent years.
30The question asked is the following: “How did you find the first job in Germany?”. The possible
answers are: Federal Employment Office, employment agency, employment agency for foreigners,
private job agency, job advertisement in the newspaper, job advertisement on the internet, through
business relationships in Germany, through friends/acquaintances/relatives (which we denote as
‘personal contacts’). We exclude here a small group of individuals who never work in the adminis-
trative archive or whose first job appears after 5 years since migration.
31Individuals who never work in the administrative data (4 percent) are not considered, since
they may be working as self-employed.
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5 Empirical Specification and Identification
In order to estimate the effect of the size of the co-ethnic network at arrival on
the employment and human capital investment of new immigrants, we adopt the
following linear estimating equation:
Yicd0t = α+βXit+γ0Netwcd0+γ1Netwcd0×Y smit+ηY smit+δd0+ψt0+θc+ǫit (5)
Where Yicd0t is an outcome for individual i from country-group of origin c in year
t who first arrived in district d0. In our main regressions the variable Y will be,
alternatively, a dummy for being employed or a dummy for being in school or train-
ing. Xit is a vector of time-varying and time-invariant individual characteristics and
includes a gender dummy, age, age squared, age at migration and its square, and
a set of pre-migration characteristics (education, working experience, employment,
and language proficiency). The variable Netwcd0 captures the size of the co-ethnic
network (previous working immigrants from the same country-group c as share of
total employment) in the district of arrival d0. It varies across country-groups and
districts, and for each individual is fixed to the value in year 0, the year of arrival.
The term δd0 captures a set of district-of-arrival fixed effects and θc captures a set
of country-of-origin fixed effects. The term ψt0 is a year-of-arrival fixed effects. The
variable Y smit is a dummy that indicates the number of years since migration for
individual i. In the main analysis we use three dummies for “years since migration”:
(Y sm0− 2)it, (Y sm3− 5)it and (Y sm6+)it, denoting the first two years, years 3-5,
and more than five years from arrival, respectively. We also experiment with a more
flexible specification including year dummies.
The nonrandom initial location of immigrants may bias the estimates of the coeffi-
cients of interest (γ′s) if unobserved individual characteristics affecting employment
and human capital investments are also correlated with the initial size of the co-
ethnic network. Controlling for pre-migration characteristics (usually not observed,
but available in our data) and including district and country-of-origin fixed effects,
which absorb systematic differences in economic performance across cities and eth-
nic groups, alleviates this issue substantially. In our main specification, we estimate
equation (5) using OLS while absorbing location specific effects and pre-migration
characteristics among the controls. We therefore only exploit differences in the size
of initial co-ethnic network unrelated to pre-migration characteristics. We only use
within-district, within country-of-origin variation, controlling for time-of-arrival ef-
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fects. Local district economic shocks that affect economic outcomes in subsequent
years and the likelihood an immigrant moves there are absorbed by district-time
effects. Similarly, specific characteristics linked to country of origin are absorbed by
fixed country effects. We estimate equation (5) using the sample of all immigrants
and a restricted sample whose members were initially dispersed and hence not sub-
ject to initial self-sorting. The restricted sample consists of people who reported in
the survey entering Germany as asylum seekers or refugees32 and of ethnic Germans
during the period of the Residence Allocation Act. Due to institutional arrange-
ments, both of these groups were subject to a dispersal policy implemented by a
central authority (see Appendix B for details about the Institutional setting). Eth-
nic Germans (Aussiedler) are migrants with German ethnicity mainly from Eastern
Europe who were subject to a random allocation as they entered Germany. This re-
stricted sample of refugees and ethnic Germans consists of 297 individuals, of whom
about one-third are asylum seekers and two thirds ethnic Germans.
The comparison between the estimates in the overall sample and those in the
restricted sample indicates whether a possible bias – induced by immigrant sorting –
still exists in the sample that decided their own location after controlling for a very
rich set of covariates: district effects, country-of-origin effects and pre-migration
individual characteristics. If most of the omitted variables bias is eliminated by this
strategy, the full sample estimation should produce coefficients similar to those using
the restricted sample. This would be a sign that the identified coefficient is consistent
with causal interpretation. Considering the whole sample of immigrants, we also
test for the individual determinants of sorting. Namely, we analyze whether the
pre-migration individual characteristics – included as controls in the main analysis
– are correlated with co-ethnic network size, and how this correlation is reduced
when we include different sets of fixed effects. Both checks reassure us that omitted
variable and selection concerns are effectively addressed by our method. In the
most demanding specifications we control for a full battery of two-way fixed effects:
country of origin by year of arrival, year of arrival by district of arrival, and country
of origin by district of arrival fixed effects.33
32In the following we will denote this group as refugees for simplicity.
33In order to do this we need to rely on pre-estimated fixed effects computed using an external
sample of immigrants obtained from administrative data, as our small sample size does not allow
us to estimate them reliably.
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6 Results
6.1 Employment
Our main empirical results are illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. All of the tables
described in this section use the same notation. The estimates in the row Netwcd0
contain the coefficient on the size of the co-ethnic network in the district of arrival.
The network variables we use throughout the analysis are standardized, i.e. they
have mean zero and standard deviation one. Our estimates measure the impact
of an increase in the size of co-ethnic network by one standard deviation on the
outcome in the initial years (0-2) after arrival. The terms (Netwcd0xYsm3-5) and
(Netwcd0xYsm6+) show the coefficients on the interactions of the initial network size
with a dummy that is equal to one when individual i has been in Germany between
three and five years or more than five years, respectively.
The dynamic effects of the initial co-ethnic network on employment are estimated
using a linear probability model, with a dummy for being employed in each year as
our dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 2. In Column 1 we only
include the non-interacted network size measure. This column is most similar to
the type of “static” estimates previously presented in the literature (see Edin et al.,
2003 and Damm, 2009 for a similar analysis on earnings.). On average, a larger
co-ethnic network at arrival significantly increases the probability of employment.
In Columns 2 and 3 we include the interactions with year since arrival and control
for basic demographics and pre-migration characteristics, and include district, year
and country-of-origin fixed effects. In Column 4 we control for the average wage
in the district as an indicator of local productivity. In Column 5 we restrict the
estimates to the sample of refugees and ethnic Germans (denoted as sample R), which
approximates more closely the condition of initial random distribution of immigrants
across districts. Columns 6 and 7 show our estimates where fixed effects (district,
year and country of origin) are estimated on a large external sample of immigrants
taken from administrative data. Columns 8 and 9 include external estimates of
two-way fixed effects (country by district, district by year, country by year). The
estimates are consistent with the basic prediction of our model, and their magnitude
is very stable across specifications. Social networks have significantly positive effects
on the probability of being employed and this effect is significant in the first two years
after arrival. When we do not include dummies for years since arrival, we obtain
a positive estimate on the network size that implies an increase of the probability
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of working by 4 percentage points (relative to an average employment rate of 68.8
percent) for an increase in the network by one standard deviation.
From Column 2 onwards, we estimate the effect interacted with year since ar-
rival. For the first two years such an increase in probability of employment is much
larger (about 10.7 percentage points), but the effect vanishes after around five years.
The results also hold when we include the full set of pre-migration characteristics
and fixed effects (Column 3) and when we include the average wage by district-year
(Column 4). These controls should capture individual characteristics affecting em-
ployment probability and local labor demand conditions. Both could be correlated
with the outcomes and with the sorting into initial networks of different size.34 The
results hold when we perform the analysis on the restricted sample of asylum seek-
ers and ethnic Germans (Column 5). Due to the drastic reduction in the sample
size, the effect is less precisely estimated. One reason may be that the fixed effects
we include are too numerous to be estimated with precision in the small sample of
surveyed immigrants. Therefore, we replicate the analysis on both samples using
pre-estimated country, year-of-arrival and district-of-arrival fixed effects (Columns 6
and 7).35 In addition, we use all possible two-way fixed effects (country of origin by
year of arrival, year of arrival by district of arrival, and district of arrival by country
of origin), also estimated out of sample, in Columns 8 and 9, representing the most
demanding specifications. It is reassuring to see the coefficients on all the network
and interaction variables are quite similar to those estimated in Columns 4 and 5.
The results remain significant after adopting different levels of clustering. In each ta-
ble we report standard errors when clustering at the individual level (in parenthesis)
as well as the more conservative clustering at the district level (in square brackets).
34An even better control for labor demand factors would be the unemployment rate by district
and year. Due to administrative changes in the registry data, we don’t have this information for
the aggregate data at district level for the years before 1999.
35The external estimation sample is a sample of 176,387 randomly drawn individuals with non-
German nationality from the 2 percent IEB registry, corresponding to 1,569,520 person-year obser-
vations. The estimated regression includes gender, education, age, age squared and the fixed effects.
Given the very high number of missing information for the education variable, the latter is imputed
using the algorithm IP1 developed by Fitzenberger et al. (2005). We estimate these fixed effects
and then import them into the main sample as additional regressors. For all regressions where we
use predicted fixed effects, we obtain the standard errors using 500 bootstrap replications.
22
6.2 Human Capital Investments
Differences in employment rates associated with large initial networks disappear over
time. What offsetting factors were at work for individuals arriving in places with
smaller co-ethnic networks? The survey includes information on the full history of
human capital investments in Germany. We analyze whether there is a systematic
relationship between social networks at arrival and investment in human capital.
The main results of this regressions are presented in Table 3. There we find rela-
tively strong evidence of a negative association between the size of the initial network
and the probability of investing in human capital in the first five years. Immigrants
arriving in cities with larger co-ethnic network by one standard deviation are 2.9
percentage points less likely to invest in human capital during their first two years
(Column 2), where the baseline average is around twelve percent. The respective
“static” effect is still negative and significant, however much lower in magnitude,
corresponding to a reduction by one percentage point (Column 1).36 These results
are consistent with our model, which predicts that individuals with larger initial
co-ethnic networks are more likely to work and less likely to pursue more education
in Germany. Results are robust to the inclusion of controls for pre-migration charac-
teristics (Column 3), as well as to the inclusion of average wage at the district-year
level (Column 4). In addition, they are robust and even stronger when we replicate
the analysis for the restricted sample of refugees and ethnic Germans (Column 5),
corresponding to a 7.5 percentage points reduction in the probability of investing
in human capital.37 The results on employment and human capital investment are
robust to restricting the sample to individuals who were younger than 24 or 29 at
migration.
6.3 Effects by Education Group
We then analyze heterogeneity according to initial human capital. Table 4 (Columns
1-3) breaks down the main sample by pre-migration educational attainments.38 The
36To the best of our knowledge this is the first estimate in the literature of the effect of co-ethnic
networks at arrival on human capital investment of immigrants.
37We cannot add pre-estimated two-way fixed effects as in the employment regressions because
we lack a comparable sample with information on human capital investments.
38In all our analysis, the breakdown by education is always obtained considering the education
obtained abroad by the year of arrival in Germany. Three education categories are considered follow-
ing the standard German classification: low skill corresponding to no vocational training, medium
skill corresponding to some form of post-secondary vocational study, and high skill corresponding
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first three columns estimate the effect of the network and its interactions with years
since migration on employment probability, separately by education group. The
overall positive initial effect of network on employment is stronger for low- and
medium-skilled immigrants, while it is close to zero and not statistically significant
for highly educated immigrants. We also find, as in Table 2, that the effect disappears
around six years after arrival. Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients of the yearly
interactions, together with the 90 and 95% confidence intervals, by year since arrival.
The top-left panel shows estimates on the full sample and the other three panels for
the education groups separately. The coefficient is significantly positive in the early
years and it converges to zero after about 4-5 years. For less-educated immigrants
the effect of co-ethnic network in job finding is substantial. Moving to a district
with one standard deviation larger co-ethnic network at arrival corresponds to a 15
percentage points greater probability of being employed. Also, for the less-educated
immigrants this effect disappears four years after migration. The network effects is
still positive, though significantly lower (8 percentage points for each one-standard-
deviation increase) for immigrants with intermediate levels of schooling. It is not
significantly different from zero for the highly skilled.
Columns 4-6 of Table 4 investigate the relationship between network size and
human capital investment for individuals with different initial education levels. Re-
sults are again driven by low- and medium-skilled workers, which is consistent with
the predictions of our model. There are no significant effects for highly-educated
workers. Our findings suggest that, after arrival, less educated immigrant workers in
places with large co-ethnic networks find employment with larger probability. The
benefits of networks, however, dissipate over time. This may be because individuals
in location with smaller networks invest more in human capital and in the long run
have the same probability of being employed as the group that started with a larger
co-ethnic network. Short-run effects on employment probability and human capital
investment are larger for the low and medium educated. In the first two years after
arrival they experience lower probability of going back to school by 3.2-3.1 percent-
age points if they land in a district with one standard deviation larger co-ethnic
networks. This difference, however, disappears after 4-5 years. In the sample of high
skilled, the effects are close to zero in magnitude and not statistically significant.
For the yearly effects see Figure 4.
to college education and above.
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6.4 Wage Effects
Table 5 analyzes the impact of co-ethnic networks on wages. In the first column we
present the coefficients estimated on the full (1) and restricted (2) samples. Columns
3-5 show the results separating individuals with low, medium and high education.
When we consider the full sample of immigrant workers (Column 1) we do not detect
significant effects on wages in the short run. In the long run, an insignificant negative
effect is present. We find, however, a negative effect on the restricted sample in the
short term (Column 2), which is substantial in magnitude (20.7 percent, or a log
difference of 0.233), and significant at the 1% level. The negative effect for this
sample decreases but persists also in the long term (18.2 percent, or a log difference
of 0.202) and remains statistically significant. Once we break down the sample by
skill group (Columns 3-5), the evidence suggests a negative and significant effect of
initial network only for the low skilled. Differently from the effect on employment,
the effect on wages for less educated persists beyond the short-term and remains
statistically significant: in the first two years since migration the reduction in hourly
wages for each standard-deviation increase in network size corresponds to 7.5 percent
(a log difference of 0.079), and it increases to 9.4 percent after six or more years.39
Such an effect is consistent with the hypothesis that initial network-generated job
referrals imply somewhat lower quality jobs. Once in these jobs, individuals miss on
human capital accumulation and their wage progression is not as fast as elsewhere,
hence they maintain this initial disadvantage.
According to the predictions of our simple theoretical setup, without additional
assumptions on the wage distribution of the two channels there is not clear prediction
on initial relative observed wages. Assuming that the two distributions have the
same expected value, there is a positive relationship between network and observed
initial wages. This prediction, however, seems not to be supported by our empirical
results for the low skilled. One possible explanation, also developed theoretically by
Bentolila et al. (2010), is that there is matching specific heterogeneity in productivity
across formal and informal channel. In particular, finding a job through the informal
39The literature provides mixed evidence about the effect of social networks on wages also for the
general population. In the seminal work of Granovetter (1973) the quality of the match depends
on how close the person is to the social contact. More recently, Loury (2006) finds that the wage
effect varies according to the type of contacts, whereas Pellizzari (2010) shows the positive effect
on wages of finding the job through the informal channel rises when the efficiency of the matching
process in the formal channel increases as firms become more selective when hiring through the
informal channel. Looking at the effect of co-ethnic networks on earnings, Damm (2009) finds a
substantial positive effect, equivalent to 18 percent, irrespective of the skill level.
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channel may be associated with a penalty due to imperfect matching.40 Indeed, if
one postulated wage offers through the informal channel to be on average lower
than those of the formal channels, this is the result that one would get. We also
implement a more flexible specification, including yearly dummies interacted with
initial network size. The estimates as well as the 90% and 95% confidence intervals
for the coefficients on year since migration dummy are reported graphically in Figure
5. The effect on wages is null for the full sample (top left panel) as well as for the
medium and high skilled, whereas it is negative and stable in the long run for the
low skilled (top right panel), with a magnitude of around 10 percent.
In the model developed above, jobs found through networks and those found in
the formal channel were not different in their quality or type. In a more general
setup, one might expect that ethnic networks of immigrants may be particularly
good in generating referrals for jobs that do not require a high level of formal educa-
tion and are in specific labor market niches. These jobs may be more easily signaled
to co-nationals of existing workers, but they may also be an imperfect match for the
specific abilities of a new immigrant and have low potential of generating a profes-
sional career, similarly to Bentolila et al. (2010). We investigate this mechanism by
analyzing whether the larger probability of employment associated with a larger size
of co-ethnic networks is also accompanied by a larger “mismatch” on the job. We
construct a measure of job mismatch from the information in the survey. Individuals
are asked about the type of education required for the current occupation and this
information is compared to the education that they effectively have. Individuals
are classified as overqualified when the education level required is lower than their
level of education; we use a dummy to indicate whether individuals are overqualified.
Given that this information is only available for the last job, we estimate the same
specification (5) as in the rest of the analysis, but using only one observation for each
individual and, hence, we simply estimate the effect of network at arrival on cur-
rent job mismatch. Moreover, we pool all individuals and include a “low-education
dummy” and its interaction with the size of the initial network.
The first row of Table 6 shows the coefficient on the low-education dummy, the
second row the coefficient on the initial co-ethnic network and the third row is the
additional effect of the network on less educated. Specifications from (1) to (4) add
progressively more controls. The estimated coefficients in Table 6 should be inter-
40In our data, the first job found through the network is unconditionally associated with a 13
percent lower wage than jobs found through other methods.
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preted as the impact of initial co-ethnic network size on the probability of being
over-qualified in the current job. We find statistically significant and economically
large effects of network size for less skilled. Workers who migrated with less edu-
cation are more likely to be - years later - in a job for which they are overqualified
when arriving in districts with larger co-ethnic networks. For low-skilled individuals,
the increase in the initial network size by one standard deviation corresponds to an
10-percentage-point-higher likelihood of being overqualified for the current job. This
magnitude translates into 24 percent of the average (41.3 percent, standard speci-
fication in Column 1) and is robust to controlling for pre-migration characteristics
(Column 2), as well as to the average wage at district-year of arrival (Column 3),
or past cognitive skills (Column 4), measured as the self-reported past test score in
math. There is no significant effect of initial network size for the medium skilled,
nor for the high skilled – our excluded category.
6.5 Networks and Job Search Methods
We have interpreted the higher probability of early employment for immigrants arriv-
ing in locations with large networks as a result of higher probability of being refereed
to a job by such network. This channel, however, has not been directly tested in the
literature.41 The reason is that, in most datasets, it is not possible to know whether
and how search methods are affected by the size of social networks. In our data, we
have direct information on the way an individual has found her first job in Germany.
This unique information allows us to investigate the effect of co-ethnic networks at
arrival on the type of search method used to find the first job in Germany. Table
7 uses – as the dependent variable – a dummy equal to one if the first job in Ger-
many was found thanks to “personal contacts”. Personal contacts – according to the
questionnaire – refer to friends, relatives, or acquaintances. We estimate a similar
specification as in Table 6, in that we use the cross-section of immigrants, we control
for their initial characteristics, and we estimate the impact of initial network size on
the probability of having found the first job through personal contacts.
The results show a significant positive association between initial network size and
the likelihood that the first job in Germany was found through personal contacts, and
41Dustmann et al. (2016) is a notable exception. The authors use German administrative data
to evaluate the effect of within-firm ethnic networks on wage growth and firm turnover. They use
the same survey that we use to show how the within-firm ethnic networks affect the probability of
finding the job through contacts.
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this is shown in Column 1 of Table 7. In particular, one standard deviation increase
in the co-ethnic network size at arrival corresponds to a 5.5 percentage points greater
likelihood of having found the first job through contacts. Columns 2-4 show that
this overall effect is driven by immigrants with moderate levels of education, for
whom the equivalent effect is larger at around 9 percentage points. This magnitude
corresponds to around 16 percent of the average (which is 54.3 percent) and is robust
to the inclusion of the usual controls and the average wage at the district of arrival.
Table D.3 in the Appendix presents the results from similar regressions (the main
results of Table 7, Column 3, are presented in Column 1 for comparison) where
the dependent variables are dummies equal to one if an individual found a job using
online advertising (Column 2) or if she used an employment agency (Column 3). The
increased reliance on personal contacts by individuals with lower levels of education
arriving in districts with larger networks corresponds to a decreased reliance on
Internet and employment agencies.42
6.6 Falsification Exercises and Robustness Checks
In our main specification, we calculate network size as the share of employed indi-
viduals from the own country group in the district of arrival. A possible concern
with our findings is that they may be driven by strong labor demand conditions for
immigrants in a district. In this case, our network measure based on individuals from
the same origin country would in part measure these favorable conditions. Hence,
in Table 8 we perform a placebo-type analysis where we investigate the specific role
of co-ethnic network, as opposed to that of the generic share of immigrants. In
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 8, we use as explanatory variable (Netwd0), the number
of all immigrants excluding co-nationals, as share of the employment of a district.
Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates of the network variable and its interactions for
the employment regressions: Column 1 reports the baseline estimates and Column
2 uses the share of foreign born excluding the co-nationals in the same district. The
estimates of Column 2 are not significantly different from zero, and are of very small
magnitude. This finding is consistent with our view that co-ethnic networks are the
determinants of the employment effect, and the results presented are not simply an
42It is worth noting here that the results of these regressions do not refer to the relative time
spent searching. Rather, they concern only the successful search method, because our question on
job search methods refers to the first job found in Germany. Therefore, we do not know whether
and to what extent other search methods have been used.
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effect of local labor market demands (proxied by a general measure of immigration).
Columns 3 and 4 perform an equivalent falsification test on the relationship
between network size and human capital investment. Column 3 presents our original
results. In Column 4 we define networks as the share of non-co-national foreign
born in local employment. Effects are not significantly different from zero, and very
small in magnitude. The results of this exercise are consistent with the mechanism
operating at the level of the co-ethnic network. In Appendix D, we perform an
additional robustness check adding a measure of cognitive skills (self-reported past
test score in math, see Table D.4) to our regression.43 Our results on employment
(Columns 1 and 2) and on human capital (Columns 3 and 4) are confirmed.
6.7 Initial Location Decision
Our survey includes a rich set of information on pre-migration characteristics: edu-
cation, employment, working experience, language proficiency, cognitive ability. In
this section, rather than simply using those characteristics as controls, we use them
to test the initial sorting of immigrants across locations, which provides an idea
of the potential endogeneity concerns for our estimates. In particular, while initial
characteristics of immigrants can be correlated with the size of co-ethnic networks
at arrival because different people have different preferences for networks, we test
whether this correlation survives the inclusion of district, country-of-origin, and year
fixed effects. If the correlation between pre-migration characteristics and size of the
network is weak once we condition on our set of fixed effects, this would imply that
individual characteristics do not explain the initial location, and hence, selection, at
least on observables, is not too concerning. If the vector of pre-migration observable
characteristics is a good proxy for unobserved characteristics affecting wage and em-
ployment after migration, this test is a check of how severe the omitted variable bias
can be in our regressions. This test of orthogonality is novel in this literature. It is
generally not possible to implement using social security data alone because infor-
mation about pre-migration variables is usually unavailable. Testing the conditional
orthogonality of the size of the co-ethnic network and individual characteristics is
not a perfect test of randomness, but it provides an important check on the corre-
lation between network size and potentially omitted variables that may affect labor
market outcomes. A similar exercise is carried out in Guryan et al. (2009) to test
43We are not including this measure in our main regressions because we would lose around 29
percent of our sample (the relative question is asked only in the second wave of the survey).
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the orthogonality between predetermined student characteristics and average class
characteristics. The exercise consists of regressing the initial network size variable on
all pre-migration variables (Table 9), first without other controls (Column 1), then
adding country-of-origin, arrival year, and arrival district fixed effects (Columns 2
and 3). While significant correlations exist (showing in particular that large initial
co-ethnic networks are associated with less educated immigrants and workers with
less work experience), none of the pre-migration variables is correlated with the ini-
tial network size (neither individually nor jointly) once we add our controls. once we
condition on district, year of arrival, and country fixed effects, there is no remaining
correlation between any pre-migration characteristic and the size of the initial net-
work. Given this evidence, we can argue, once we include a full set of fixed effect
dummies, our results are not significantly affected by sorting.
Finally, we check that our results are robust to different geographical levels at
which one can measure co-ethnic networks. Throughout the paper we use districts
as units. Here, instead, we use municipalities, i.e. smaller units, of which there are
about 12,000 in Germany. Table D.6 in Appendix D shows that our main estimates
are robust to this change.44
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper looks at co-ethnic networks of immigrants in Germany and their role
in helping the economic success of new immigrants. In particular, we investigate
how the size of co-ethnic networks at arrival affects employment and human capital
investments of immigrants soon after arrival, and in the following years. We develop
a simple search model where individuals can search through a formal channel and
an informal, network-based channel. In the informal channel, co-ethnic networks
help individuals find employment by providing referrals. Such a model predicts
an initial lower probability of employment for individuals with smaller size of co-
ethnic networks. Over time, our model predicts convergence to similar employment
probability and possibly higher wages for those with smaller co-ethnic networks
because of higher human capital investments.
Our main dataset combines a novel survey of immigrants to Germany with admin-
istrative records to reconstruct the entire individual labor market history of recent
44Other papers also use small units, such as Bayer et al. (2008) who use Census blocks, whereas
Schmutte (2015) considers small neighborhoods.
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immigrants, as well as their district of arrival in Germany. Our empirical evidence
is consistent with the main implications of our model: individuals with larger ethnic
networks are more likely to be employed soon after arrival, but are less likely to
invest in human capital and are no more likely to be employed several years after
arrival. In addition, the initial co-ethnic network exerts a negative long run effect
on wages and on match quality. These effects are stronger for initially less-educated
immigrants.
Identifying the effect of co-ethnic networks on human capital investment of re-
cent immigrants is a new contribution of this paper, and suggests that, while positive
overall, co-ethnic networks may give a larger initial boost that attenuates over time
and can cause under-investment in human capital. Previous empirical estimations of
network effects for immigrants such as Edin et al. (2003) and Damm (2009) empha-
sized only the earnings effect and lacked a dynamic analysis. As they found a positive
impact of networks on earnings, they argued that dispersal policies have high costs
for immigrants, worsening their labor market outcomes. The implications from our
results, however, suggest a more complex story. While in the short-run employment
probability may be increased by the presence of co-ethnic networks, dynamically
they may reduce human capital accumulation and lower the quality of job matches
and wages. Ignoring those effects may result in overestimating the negative effects of
dispersal policies. Thanks to better data (inclusive of pre-migration characteristics)
we can contribute to the literature by identifying with greater confidence the causal
effect of co-ethnic networks on several different outcomes of immigrants in the short
and in the long run.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Time Variant Variables
Netwcd0 0.012 0.018 12241
Employment 0.688 0.463 12241
Human Capital Investment 0.044 0.205 12186
Real Hourly Wage 8.506 4.003 4821
Year since Migr:0-2 0.228 0.419 12241
Year since Migr:3-5 0.214 0.410 12241
Year since Migr:6+ 0.558 0.497 12241
Age 37.017 10.452 12241
Individual Variables
West 0.105 0.307 933
East Eu 0.129 0.335 933
Turkey 0.064 0.245 933
South and East EU 0.202 0.401 933
USSR 0.427 0.495 933
Asia 0.047 0.212 933
Africa 0.020 0.141 933
Central and South America 0.006 0.080 933
First Job Found through Contacts 0.543 0.498 806
Low Edu 0.421 0.494 933
Pre Migration Edu: Medium 0.339 0.474 933
Pre Migration Edu: High 0.240 0.427 933
Pre migration Employment 0.726 0.446 929
Pre migration Language Proficiency 0.115 0.319 930
Pre migration work Experience 10.245 9.716 933
Age at Migration 30.504 9.895 933
Overqualified in current Job 0.413 0.493 644
Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB.
32
T
ab
le
2:
N
et
w
or
k
at
M
ig
ra
ti
on
an
d
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e:
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(d
um
m
y)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
N
et
w
t
0
0.
04
0*
**
0.
10
7*
**
0.
10
5*
**
0.
10
1*
**
0.
09
7
0.
09
8*
**
0.
10
4*
*
0.
09
3*
**
0.
11
2*
*
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
48
)
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
50
]
N
et
w
t
0
xY
sm
3-
5
-0
.0
76
**
*
-0
.0
74
**
*
-0
.0
75
**
*
-0
.0
70
-0
.0
71
**
*
-0
.0
72
-0
.0
73
**
*
-0
.0
73
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
65
)
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
62
]
N
et
w
t
0
xY
sm
6+
-0
.0
99
**
*
-0
.0
98
**
*
-0
.1
00
**
*
-0
.1
01
-0
.1
05
**
*
-0
.1
19
-0
.1
03
**
*
-0
.1
18
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
75
)
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
72
]
In
di
vi
du
al
s
93
3
93
3
92
6
92
6
29
7
92
6
29
7
92
5
29
7
O
bs
12
24
1
12
24
1
12
13
2
12
13
2
42
40
12
13
2
42
40
12
11
8
42
40
R
2
0.
13
8
0.
23
0
0.
23
6
0.
23
6
0.
37
6
0.
10
7
0.
18
3
0.
10
7
0.
18
6
M
ea
n
D
ep
.
V
ar
0.
68
8
0.
65
2
B
as
e
C
on
tr
.
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
P
re
-M
ig
ra
ti
on
C
on
tr
.
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
Si
ng
le
F
E
s
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
no
no
Si
ng
le
F
E
s
(p
re
di
ct
ed
)
no
no
no
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
D
ou
bl
e
F
E
s
(p
re
di
ct
ed
)
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
M
ea
n
W
ag
e
no
no
no
ye
s
no
no
ye
s
no
no
Sa
m
pl
e
fu
ll
fu
ll
fu
ll
fu
ll
R
fu
ll
R
fu
ll
R
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t.
A
ll
n
et
w
o
rk
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
:
th
e
re
le
v
a
n
t
co
effi
ci
en
t
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s
to
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
a
n
in
cr
ea
se
b
y
o
n
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
.
B
a
se
co
n
tr
o
ls
:
g
en
d
er
,
a
g
e
a
n
d
a
g
e
a
t
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
(a
n
d
it
s
sq
.)
,
co
u
n
tr
y
o
f
o
ri
g
in
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
,
y
ea
r
a
t
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
,
a
n
d
d
is
tr
ic
t
a
t
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
P
re
-m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
co
n
tr
o
ls
:
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t,
la
n
g
u
a
g
e
p
ro
fi
ci
en
cy
,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
w
o
rk
in
g
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
.
S
a
m
p
le
R
:
in
cl
u
d
es
o
n
ly
th
o
se
w
h
o
m
ig
ra
te
d
to
G
er
m
a
n
y
a
s
a
sy
lu
m
se
ek
er
s/
re
fu
g
ee
s,
o
r
et
h
n
ic
G
er
m
a
n
s
m
ig
ra
ti
n
g
in
th
e
p
er
io
d
co
v
er
ed
b
y
th
e
la
w
o
f
ra
n
d
o
m
a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(6
)-
(7
)
w
e
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
p
re
d
ic
te
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
,
th
a
t
w
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
a
n
ex
te
rn
a
l
sa
m
p
le
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
:
y
ea
r
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l,
d
is
tr
ic
t
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l,
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
g
ro
u
p
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(8
)-
(9
)
w
e
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
ex
te
rn
a
ll
y
p
re
-
d
ic
te
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
:
y
ea
r
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l-
d
is
tr
ic
t
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l,
co
u
n
tr
y
-y
ea
r
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l,
co
u
n
tr
y
-d
is
tr
ic
t
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l.
A
ll
p
re
d
ic
te
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
u
si
n
g
a
ra
n
d
o
m
sa
m
p
le
o
f
1
7
4
,5
8
1
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
fr
o
m
IE
B
d
a
ta
.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
n
g
re
g
re
ss
io
n
in
cl
u
d
ed
th
e
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
re
g
re
ss
o
rs
:
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
a
g
e
a
n
d
it
s
sq
u
a
re
d
,
a
n
d
g
en
d
er
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
le
v
el
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
)-
(5
)
w
it
h
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
a
n
d
a
re
fu
rt
h
er
o
b
ta
in
ed
w
it
h
5
0
0
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(6
)-
(9
).
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
sq
u
a
re
b
ra
ck
et
s
re
fe
r
to
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
w
it
h
cl
u
st
er
in
g
a
t
d
is
tr
ic
t
o
f
a
rr
iv
a
l
le
v
el
.
T
h
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
le
v
el
s
re
fe
r
to
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
cl
u
st
er
in
g
.
33
Table 3: Network at Migration and Investment in Human Capital
Dependent Variable: Investment in Human Capital (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Netwt0 -0.008** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.075***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026)
[0.003] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.027]
Netwt0xYsm3-5 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.033
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020)
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.021]
Netwt0xYsm3-5 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.061***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019)
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.021]
Individuals 933 933 926 926 297
Obs 12186 12186 12094 12094 4233
R2 0.141 0.206 0.209 0.209 0.327
Mean Dep. Var 0.043 0.061
Pre-Migration Contr. no no yes yes yes
Mean Wage no no no yes no
Sample full full full full R
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for being in education. Network variables are
standardized. Base controls (in all regressions): gender, age and age at migration (and its
sq.), country of origin fixed effects, year at migration fixed effects, and district at migration
fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment, language proficiency, education, working
experience. Sample R: refugees and ethnic Germans. Standard errors in parenthesis are clus-
tered at individual level, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. We report standard errors clus-
tered at district level in square brackets.
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Table 4: Network, Employment and Human Capital Investment by Education
Dep. Var. Work/Not Work HC Investment
Education Low Medium High Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Netwt0 0.146*** 0.079* 0.003 -0.032** -0.031*** 0.005
(0.027) (0.041) (0.059) (0.016) (0.009) (0.025)
[0.033] [0.041] [0.073] [0.017] [0.010] [0.023]
Netwt0xYsm3-5 -0.079*** -0.097*** -0.039 0.021 0.013* 0.008
(0.025) (0.033) (0.030) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019)
[0.024] [0.036] [0.035] [0.015] [0.007] [0.021]
Netwt0xYsm6+ -0.121*** -0.076** -0.068 0.044*** 0.026*** 0.015
(0.024) (0.030) (0.041) (0.015) (0.009) (0.019)
[0.029] [0.030] [0.052] [0.016] [0.010] [0.020]
Individuals 389 314 223 389 314 223
Obs 5445 4031 2656 5424 4031 2639
R2 0.311 0.290 0.363 0.325 0.128 0.207
Mean Dep. Var 0.674 0.704 0.689 0.061 0.021 0.043
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for employment (columns 1-3), or a indicator for being in education (columns
4-6). Education is measured before migration. Low education refers to lower secondary education. Medium and high re-
fer to upper secondary, and tertiary education, respectively. All network variables are standardised. Controls include base
controls and pre-migration controls. Base controls: gender, age and age at migration (and its sq.), country of origin fixed
effects, year at migration fixed effects, and district at migration fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment, language
proficiency, education, working experience. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at individual level, * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. We report standard errors clustered at district level in square brackets.
Table 5: Network and Wages
Dependent Variable: Hourly Wage (log)
Education Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Netwt0 (a) -0.007 -0.233*** -0.079** 0.080 -0.127
(0.032) (0.086) (0.033) (0.058) (0.154)
[0.034] [0.111] [0.036] [0.070] [0.154]
Netwt0xYsm3-5 -0.017 0.059* -0.010 -0.052* -0.010
(0.015) (0.032) (0.022) (0.029) (0.025)
[0.015] [0.032] [0.021] [0.028] [0.027]
Netwt0xYsm6+ (b) -0.030 0.031 -0.020 -0.009 -0.076**
(0.018) (0.041) (0.024) (0.034) (0.037)
[0.016] [0.042] [0.020] [0.032] [0.038]
Individuals 668 216 277 228 163
Obs 4934 1650 2151 1723 1060
R2 0.489 0.647 0.593 0.627 0.691
(a)+(b)==0 (p-value) 0.191 0.010 0.000 0.181 0.191
Mean Dep. Var 8.498 7.656 7.702 7.782 11.368
Sample full R full full full
Note: The dependent variable is the (log) real average hourly wage, considering only full time spells, and excluding marginal
employment, and apprenticeship. Sample: individuals working at least once within the year, only full time workers are con-
sidered. Education is measured before migration. Low education refers to lower secondary education. Medium and high
refer to upper secondary, and tertiary education, respectively. All network variables are standardised. Base controls and
pre-migration controls in all specifications. Base controls: gender, age and age at migration (and its sq.), country of origin
fixed effects, year at migration fixed effects, and district at migration fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment, lan-
guage proficiency, education, working experience. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at individual level, * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. We report standard errors clustered at district level in square brackets.
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Table 6: Network at Migration and Over-qualification in the current Job
Dependent Variable: Over-qualification (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Edu -0.240** -0.243** -0.240* -0.282**
(0.112) (0.121) (0.122) (0.138)
Netwt0 (a) -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.035
(0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.058)
Netwt0xLow Edut0 (b) 0.113** 0.110** 0.111** 0.122**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.055)
Individuals 644 639 639 518
R2 0.617 0.624 0.625 0.647
(a)+(b)==0 (p-value) 0.023 0.027 0.029 0.078
Mean Dep. Var 0.413
Pre-Migration Controls no yes yes yes
Average Wage at Distt0xYeart0 no no yes no
Past Cognitive Skill no no no yes
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for being overqualified in the current job. All network variables are stan-
dardised. Base controls (included in all regressions): current education, age and age at migration (and its sq.), country of
origin fixed effects, years since migration squared, year at migration fixed effects, and district at migration fixed effects.
Pre-migration controls: employment, language proficiency, education, working experience. Past cognitive skill: self-reported
test score in math. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 7: Network and first Job in Germany found through Contacts
Dependent Variable: Job Found through Contacts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Edut0 0.101* 0.090 0.090
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062)
Netwt0 (a) 0.055*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.003
(0.016) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Netwt0 xLow Edut0 (b) 0.087* 0.098** 0.099**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Individuals 806 806 799 799
R2 0.013 0.419 0.428 0.429
(a)+(b)==0 (p-value) 0.099 0.075 0.057
Mean Dep. Var. 0.543
Base Controls no yes yes yes
Pre-Migration Controls no no yes yes
Average Wage at Distt0xYeart0 no no no yes
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for finding the first job in Germany through contacts
(friends/acquaintances/relatives). All network variables are standardised: the relevant coefficient corresponds to the effect
of an increase by one standard deviation. Base controls: gender, age at migration (and its sq.), country of origin fixed effects,
year at migration fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment, language proficiency, education, working experience.
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
36
Table 8: Falsification Test: Network of all Other Immigrants
Dependent Variable: Employment Human Capital
Network: Baseline Other Baseline Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Netwt0 0.105*** -0.007 -0.028*** 0.002
(0.021) (0.037) (0.009) (0.013)
Netwt0xYsm3-5 -0.074*** -0.012 0.011 0.000
(0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007)
Netwt0xYsm6+ -0.098*** -0.025 0.031*** 0.000
(0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
Individuals 926 926 926 926
Obs 12132 12132 12094 12094
R2 0.236 0.230 0.209 0.206
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for employment (columns 1-2), and an indicator for being in education (columns
3-4). In column (2) and (4) the network variable is computed using all immigrants in the district of arrival excluding those
from the country of origin of the individual. Controls include base controls and pre-migration controls. Base controls: gen-
der, age at migration (and its sq.), country of origin fixed effects, year at migration fixed effects, and district at migration
fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment, language proficiency, education, working experience. All network Vari-
ables are standardised. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at individual level, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 9: Test of Network Sorting
Dependent Variable: Netwcd0
Pre-Migration Variable (1) (2) (3)
Language 0.104 -0.035 -0.019
(0.101) (0.071) (0.084)
[0.120] [0.082] [0.101]
Employment -0.090 0.013 0.061
(0.074) (0.049) (0.055)
[0.071] [0.050] [0.065]
Work Experience -0.011*** 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
Education: Medium -0.154** -0.004 0.003
(0.064) (0.052) (0.058)
[0.059] [0.051] [0.054]
Education: High -0.090 -0.007 0.026
(0.073) (0.056) (0.069)
[0.076] [0.065] [0.084]
Cognitive Ability -0.049
(0.048)
[0.057]
Individuals 926 926 746
R2 0.040 0.779 0.783
All Coefficients = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.993 0.820
District of arrival no yes yes
Year of arrival no yes yes
Country of origin no yes yes
Note: The dependent variable is the network at migration. Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
We report standard errors clustered at district level in square brackets.
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Figure 1: Searching for a Job and Human Capital Investment
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Figure 2: Wages at t = 2 for a Given Level of Initial Human Capital
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Figure 3: Effect of Network at Migration on Employment
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Note: the graphs report the coefficients of the network effect interacted with years since migration
as well as confidence intervals (5 percent and 10 percent). The dependent variable is an indicator for
employment defined as in Table 2. The estimated regression corresponds to specification (5), where
we use yearly dummies for years since migration. Standard errors are clustered at individual level.
Controls: gender, age and age at migration (and their squared), pre-migration controls, country,
district and year at arrival fixed effects.
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Figure 4: Effect of Network at Migration on Human Capital Investment
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Note: the graphs report the coefficients of the network effect interacted with years since migration as
well as confidence intervals (5 percent and 10 percent). The dependent variable is a indicator for being
in education defined as in Table 3. The estimated regression corresponds to specification (5), where
we use yearly dummies for years since migration. Standard errors are clustered at individual level.
Controls: gender, age and age at migration (and their squared), pre-migration controls, country,
district and year at arrival fixed effects.
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Figure 5: Effect of Network at Migration on (log) hourly Wage
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Note: the graphs report the coefficients of the network effect interacted with year since migration as
well as confidence intervals (5 percent and 10 percent). The dependent variable is the (log) of real
average hourly wages defined as in Table 5. The estimated regression corresponds to specification
(5), where we use yearly dummies for each year since migration. Standard errors are clustered at
individual level. Controls: gender, age and age at migration (and their squared), pre-migration
controls, country, district and year at arrival fixed effects.
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Appendices for Online Publication
A Analytical Discussion of Propositions
In Section 3, we discuss three Prepositions with the three main implications of our
simple model, which we compare to what we find in our empirical exercise. In this
short Appendix we present a slightly more structured discussion as a way to motivate
those prepositions. We first focus on Proposition 2, which concerns the effects of a
changing level of n1 on the choice of our agent between searching and human capital
investment, taking h1 as given. Here we will therefore look at the derivatives with
respect to n, and then look at the effects of changing h on outcomes as a comparative
statics exercise. In order to evaluate the effects of initial network size on the t = 1
choice between human capital investment (H1) and searching for a job (S1), lets us
look at the first derivative of these functions with respect to n.
∂H1
∂n1
= β
(
∂S(h′)
∂n1
)
(6)
Let us now look at the first derivative of the S1 function with respect to n1.
∂S1
∂n1
= (1 + β)
(
∂S(h¯)
∂n1
)
(7)
In order to sign the above two derivatives we need to sign ∂S(h)
∂n1
, the next step. In
order to mantain relatively compact notation, let us define:
∫
max{xi − bu, 0}dFi(xi) ≡ A (8)∫
max{xf − bu, 0}dFf (xf ) ≡ B (9)∫
max{xi − bu, xf − bu, 0}dFi(xi)dFf (xf ) ≡ C (10)
We can now write
∂S(h)
∂n
=
∂pi
∂n
(1− pf (h))A− pf (h)
∂pi
∂n
B +
∂pi
∂n
pf (h)C
=
∂pi
∂n
[(1− pf (h))A+ pf (h)(C − B)]
(11)
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Assuming that these two distributions have common support, C > B (if the common
support assumption does not hold, this equation would hold as weak inequality). In
other words, the value of drawing twice from two distributions that partially overlap
and picking the better outcome is strictly better (in expectations) than drawing from
one of those distributions only. Therefore, ∂S(h)
∂n
> 0. This implies that both the
value of searching and the value of human capital investment increase in n1. The
outcome from searching is positively affected by networks, which makes it more likely
to find a job and increase the expected wage (because of the increased probability
of drawing two offers and picking the higher one in that case).
What can help us understand how n1 affects our individual’s decision is to com-
pare these two derivatives. We therefore compare ∂S(h
′)
∂n1
with ∂S(h¯)
∂n1
where h′ > h¯.
Let us write the cross derivative of S with respect to n and h as
∂2S(h)
∂n∂h
= −
∂pi
∂n
∂pf
∂h
A−
∂pi
∂n
∂pf
∂h
B +
∂pi
∂n
∂pf
∂h
C
=
∂pi
∂n
∂pf
∂h
(C − A− B)
(12)
Under our assumption that both wage distributions have only non negative outcomes
C < A+B. This directly implies that ∂S
2(h)
∂n∂h
< 0, which in turn means that ∂S(h
′)
∂n
<
∂S(h¯)
∂n
. In words, when individuals have high levels of human capital in our setup, the
marginal effect of network size on search outcomes is (positive but) smaller. Since
β > 0, this means that ∂S
∂n
> ∂H1
∂n
. This result, together with the results on second
derivative we move to next, helps us analyze the comparative statics of the choice
outlined by our model intuitively and graphically.
Having established that both the value of human capital investment and the
value of searching for a job are monotonically increasing in n1 for a given level of h1,
we next look at the second derivative of the same two functions.
∂2H1
∂n2
= β
(
∂2S(h′)
∂n2
)
(13)
∂2S1
∂n2
= (1 + β)
(
∂2S(h¯)
∂n2
)
(14)
In order to sign these derivatives and compare them, we need to sign the terms in
brackets. We evaluate that term for a generic h so that we can investigate how it is
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affected by the level of h.
∂2S(h)
∂n2
=
∂2pi
∂n2
(1− pf (h))A− pf (h)
∂2pi
∂n2
B +
∂2pi
∂n2
pf (h)C
=
∂2pi
∂n2
(1− pf (h))A+
∂2pi
∂n2
pf (h)(C − B) < 0
(15)
since C > B. So both our value functions (human capital investment and search,
given initial human capital level) have negative second derivatives.
In order to accurately draw those functions and in particular to evaluate whether
the single-crossing result holds, it is useful to look at whether and how the magnitude
of this second derivative depends on h. It is useful to rewrite the equation above as
∂2S(h)
∂n2
=
∂2pi
∂n2
A+
∂2pi
∂n2
(C − A− B) pf (h) (16)
The first term of equation (16) above is unaffected by h. The second term is positive
because ∂
2pi
∂n2
< 0 and C − A − B < 0. Since
∂pf (h)
∂h
> 0, the overall derivative is
increasing in h (it is less negative for larger values of h). We can now compare the
second derivatives of the human capital investment and job searching functions:
∂2S(h′)
∂n2
>
∂2S(h¯)
∂n2
β
∂2S(h′)
∂n2
> (1 + β)
∂2S(h¯)
∂n2
(17)
where the second line follows from the fact that both second derivatives are negatives
and β is positive. Therefore,
∂2H1
∂n2
>
∂2S1
∂n2
(18)
In words, we found that both the value function for human capital investment and
for job search are monotonically increasing concave functions of network size (for
a given level of human capital initial endowment), and that both first and second
derivatives are smaller (in absolute value) for the human capital investment function.
With the information above, we can draw the S1 and the H1 curves on a chart, which
lets us evaluate the content of Propositions 1 and 2. To the left of the intersection
point nh in Figure A.1 the individual will decide to invest in human capital, because
it give higher utility in expectations. To the right of nh (i.e. for larger size of initial
social network) she will decide to search for a job. Figure A.1 is drawn for a certain
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Figure A.1: Value of search and of human capital investment
n1
S1(h), H1(h)
H1(h)
S1(h)
nh
human capital h. However, the relative position of the two curves depend on the
level of initial human capital and on other parameters. For example, under certain
parameter configurations there may be a corner solution where h is sufficiently high
that the the value of search is higher than the value of human capital investment
even on the vertical axis. In this case, the agent will decide to look for a job at
t = 1 for all levels of n1. From Figure A.1 above we can also investigate the effects
of changing h1 on the equilibrium values. Since each curve on the chart above is
drawn for a certain level of h, curves will shift as we let h vary. Symmetrically to
our analysis for n above, it is very easy to show that
∂S1
∂h
>
∂H1
∂h
(19)
while both derivatives are positive, the S1 curve reacts more strongly than the H1
curve to changes in h. Looking back at Figure A.1, as we increase h the equilibrium
value of n that will make our individual indifferent between searching for a job and
acquiring human capital at t = 1 will be lower. If we compare two individuals
with the same social network but with different levels of initial human capital, the
individual with higher initial human capital is more likely to start looking for a job
earlier. Based on equation (12) above, at higher levels of h the effect of network on
both curves is smaller is magnitude, and therefore equilibrium values respond less
to changes in n at higher levels of h, which is what Proposition 3 states.
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B Institutional Background: Random Allocation of Asy-
lum Seekers and Ethnic Germans
The allocation of asylum seekers is regulated at Federal level by the Asylum Proce-
dure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz ). According to the law asylum seekers are allocated
first to initial reception facilities and have no freedom to move. Each Federal State
is assigned a defined quota (Königsteiner Schlüssel), which is calculated every year
according to the tax receipts and population of the State. Consideration is also given
to whether the branch office of the Federal Office responsible for the reception center
deals with the asylum seeker’s home country. After the first period in reception
facilities, which can last up to a maximum of six months, the asylum seekers are
placed in a district within the state of the first allocation. The state authorities
decide whether to place them in collective accommodations, or whether to grant
the applicant a permit to take an apartment. This discretionary decision must take
account of both the public interest and the asylum seeker’s personal concerns. The
residence obligation ends as soon as the Federal Office grants asylum or refugee sta-
tus. In special cases, for example in cases of family reunification, asylum seekers may
also be assigned to a different reception center at their own request. The average
duration of the application procedure was around two years as of 2010.
In case of ethnic Germans the allocation was regulated by the Residence Alloca-
tion Act (Wohnortzuweisungsgesetz ). Starting from July 1989, ethnic Germans were
granted a German visa upon application, and registered with a central authority.
Those without a job (which comprised the vast majority of them) were distributed
to one of the 16 federal states according to pre-specified state quotas. The fur-
ther allocation to districts was regulated within each federal state, according to
state-specific allocation. In some cases, the applicant could ask to join the relatives
already living in the country. However, since the constraint of residence restriction
turned out not to be enforced, a new law was passed in March 1996, which made
the restriction stricter. Those who moved from the assigned district lost access to
welfare benefits. The law was then abolished in December 2009. In our analysis
we select only ethnic Germans entering Germany between 1996 and 2009, when the
restriction on residence was stricter (see Glitz, 2012).
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C Survey Data linked to Administrative records
The IAB-SOEP Migration Sample is a new longitudinal survey of individuals with
migration background in Germany. The survey is carried out jointly by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) and the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP).
The survey has a panel structure, the first wave was carried out in 2013 and the
second wave in 2014. The starting sample consisted of around 5,000 individuals.
Part of the original sample (the head of household) was drawn from the German
Social Security Archive (IEB), therefore the head of households are individuals who
have been at least once part of the labor force, registered as unemployed, or benefits
recipient. All family members were also interviewed. A subsample of the original
survey sample has been linked to the social security data (IEB), using a personal
identifier. At the end of the questionnaire, due to data protection, respondents
are asked to give their consent for the record linkage. The overall approval rate
amounts to around 50 percent. The final linked sample consists of 2,089 individuals:
2,028 from the first wave and 61 from the second wave. Our sample consists of 933
individuals: 922 from the first wave and 17 from the second wave. This final sample
is obtained excluding second generation migrants, those with missing information in
the variables of interest, and those entering as student or still in education at the
time of the survey.
D Additional Tables
Table D.1: Comparing Refugees and non Refugees in Survey Data (share)
Refugees Not Refugees P-value
Pre Migration Employment 0.519 0.442 0.001
Pre Migration Edu: Low 0.586 0.700 0.000
Pre Migration Edu: Medium 0.241 0.154 0.000
Pre Migration Edu: High 0.174 0.146 0.119
Pre Migration Language: Good 0.130 0.060 0.000
Current Language: Good 0.581 0.473 0.000
Source: IAB/SOEP Migration Sample (first and second wave). P-value: significant
difference between two samples.
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Table D.2: Employment and Human Capital Investment Over Time (share)
Years since Migration Work In Education
0-2 0.480 0.119
3-5 0.717 0.040
6-9 0.757 0.020
10+ 0.763 0.011
Total 0.688 0.044
Note: Data sources: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample linked to IEB data.
Table D.3: Network at Migration and Methods of Finding the First Job in Germany
Method Contacts Internet Empl. Agency
(1) (2) (3)
Low Edut0 0.090 -0.039 -0.004
(0.062) (0.043) (0.041)
Netwt0 (a) -0.008 -0.034 0.033
(0.054) (0.043) (0.034)
Netwt0 xLow Edut0 (b) 0.098** -0.043 -0.041
(0.045) (0.037) (0.030)
Individuals 799 799 799
R2 0.428 0.362 0.404
(a)+(b)==0 (p-value) 0.075 0.060 0.799
Mean Dep. Var 0.543 0.181 0.183
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for different methods of finding the first job in Germany, the method varying
according to the heading. All network variables are standardised: the relevant coefficient corresponds to the effect of an
increase by one standard deviation. Controls include base controls and pre-migration controls. Base controls: gender, age at
migration (and its sq.), country of origin fixed effects, year at migration fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment,
language proficiency, education, working experience. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.4: Robustness. Control for Cognitive Skills
Dependent variable: Employment Human Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Netwt0 0.105*** 0.094*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010)
Netwt0xYsm3-5 -0.074*** -0.081*** 0.011 0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Netwt0xYsm6+ -0.098*** -0.095*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Cognitive Skills 0.019 0.004
(0.021) (0.009)
Individuals 926 752 926 746
Obs 12132 9782 12094 9660
R2 0.236 0.246 0.209 0.215
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for employment (column 1-2), and a indicator for being in education (column
3-4). Past cognitive ability refers to an indicator for self-reported test score in Maths when in school. Controls include base
controls and pre-migration controls. Base controls: gender, age at migration (and its sq.), country of origin fixed effects,
year at migration fixed effects, and district at migration fixed effects. Pre-migration controls: employment, language pro-
ficiency, education, working experience. All network variables are standardised: the relevant coefficient corresponds to the
effect of an increase by one standard deviation. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at individual level, * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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